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The Evolution of Development Thinking:  Theory and Policy
Gustav Ranis
Abstract
This paper makes an effort to trace the course of development thinking and associated
development policy over the past six decades.
Section I focuses on the early Post-War Consensus, with theory focused on extensions of
classical dualism theory and policy concentrating on creating the pre-conditions for
development.  Section II traces the increasing awareness of the role of prices, a diminishing
reliance on the developmentalist state and an increased reliance on structural adjustment lending
associated with IFI conditionality.  Section III illuminates the search for “silver bullets” which
can be identified as key to the achievement of success. Finally, Section IV presents the author’s
assessment of where we are now and where we will, or should be, heading in the effort to
achieve the third world’s basic development objectives.
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I. The Early Post-War Consensus 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the previously neglected sub-field of Development Economics 
was rediscovered.  Available economic models seemed to offer only limited insights into the 
practical problems facing the so-called Third World.  The dominant one-sector macro models of 
the day, from Keynesian to Harrod-Domar (see Harrod 1939 and Domar 1957) to Solow 1956, 
seemed to have relatively little relevance for societies not primarily concerned with business 
cycles or steady state properties.  Most contemporary growth models, in other words, were seen 
as advanced country-related, relatively abstract theoretical constructs, faithful to the dominant 
assumptions of neoclassical macro-theory:  full employment, market clearing and perfect 
competition, all of which seemed to have little relevance for the segmented commodity, labor 
and credit markets of the poor countries.   
 Against this background, the concept of dualism attracted considerable attention.  
Sociological dualism associated with the name of Boeke 1953 emphasized differences between 
Western and non-Western objectives and cultures; technological dualism pointed to by Higgins 
1956 and Eckaus 1955 focused on the difference between variable factor proportions in 
traditional and fixed coefficients in modern sectors; a third and increasingly dominant strand 
focused on the coexistence of sectors basically asymmetrical in behavior and thus dualistic in 
some key analytical dimensions.  The first clear manifestation of this third version of dualism 
undoubtedly appeared in the tableau economique of the physiocrats who emphasized the 
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importance of an agricultural surplus supporting non-productive activities elsewhere; but it was 
classical dualism, coinciding more or less with the advent of what was erroneously termed the 
industrial revolution in Western Europe, which provided the raw materials for the renewed 
emphasis on dualism in early post-World War II development theory.   
It was classical school concepts, owing much to Ricardo 1951, which focused attention 
on the coexistence of a still overwhelmingly large agricultural sector subject to diminishing 
returns to labor on basically fixed land, and non-agricultural activities growing as a consequence 
mainly of the accumulation of fixed capital and labor drawn out of agriculture which were 
central to the story.  While the classical school did not really model the interaction between these 
two sectors, it is clear that the main fuel for the reallocation of labor and for the accumulation of 
industrial capital was seen as coming from the profits of agricultural capitalists.  It should, of 
course, be noted that the assumption of the near-fixity of land was combined with Malthusian 
(see Malthus 1815) population pressures and with the notion of an institutionally determined 
agricultural real wage, even though, in contrast to the physiocratic view, the laboring class was 
now free and in a position to bargain with capitalist landlords in setting the level of that wage.  
As is well known, Ricardian/Malthusian pessimism with respect to the ultimate stagnation of 
agriculture in the absence of marked technology change was a dominant feature of their 
analytical work.  Whether innovations in industry, reflecting Smith’s relative optimism, would 
be strong enough to provide sufficient industrial profits to rescue the situation remained a 
controversial issue. 
 The first modern theorists to build on classical dualism were undoubtedly Rosenstein-
Rodan 1943, Mandelbaum 1945 and Nurkse 1953, all of whom, in their own way, pointed to the 
existence of surplus labor as a potential resource which, once reallocated from agriculture to 
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higher productivity pursuits in non-agriculture, would constitute a major fuel for development.  
But it was Arthur Lewis 1954 who, in his famous 1954 article, built on some of the main 
ingredients of the classical tradition, focusing more precisely on dualism in labor markets (i.e., a 
competitive wage in non-agriculture tied to a bargaining or institutional wage in agriculture).  
Lewis, moreover, found himself allied with Smith 1880 in seeing the relatively small non-
agricultural commercialized sector as the dynamic partner, expanding and fed by the 
mobilization of the hidden rural savings which Nurkse and Rosenstein-Rodan had identified.  In 
Lewis’s view, the reallocation process would continue until all the surplus agricultural labor (i.e., 
not necessarily zero marginal product labor but, as emphasized by Fei and Ranis 1961, 1964, all 
those whose remuneration exceeded their low marginal product) had moved out of agriculture 
into commercialized non-agriculture, marking a turning point at which time dualism would 
atrophy and the economy become fully neoclassical.  
It is fair to say that the theoretical elements of this early post-war consensus focused on 
capital scarcity and savings-pushed growth, with relatively minor emphasis on technology 
change in either sector.  Moreover, both Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse very much emphasized 
the need for balanced growth, not only between agriculture and non-agriculture, but also on the 
need for balance within each sector, so that Say’s Law could come into play and shoes and socks 
would both be produced, feeding each other on both the supply and demand sides.  It is also 
noteworthy that there was a good deal of elasticity pessimism in the air during those years, both 
with respect to agricultural response mechanisms, as already noted, and with respect to the open 
economy, i.e. export opportunities. The international trade scene, dominated by Prebisch 1962, 
Singer 1950 and Myrdal 1957, was painted in colors unfriendly to development.  There were, of 
course, some early critics of various aspects of dualism, on the one hand, and of structuralism, on 
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the other, represented by adherents to the neo-classical paradigm.  To one degree or another they 
rejected the notion of labor surplus (Schultz 1964) and the non-responsiveness to price signals of 
various actors (Haberler 1988 and Bauer 1957).  But they were clearly voices in the wilderness. 
 The prevailing theoretical winds indicated that, on the policy side, there was a strong 
inclination to turn to the interventionist state as a key instrument of development.  The 
motivation for this trend was at least twofold.  One was the desire to cut pre-independence 
colonial ties which were identified with the market mechanism; and second, there was a felt need 
to create an economy out of what was often still viewed as an agglomeration of agents and 
resources requiring, first of all, the creation of the so-called “preconditions of development.”  At 
home, the interventionist state accordingly felt the need to create infrastructure, the institutions 
required to permit the functioning of a national entity, plus the subsidization in various ways of 
newly created non-agricultural entrepreneurs, complemented, on the international side, by the 
infamous import substitution syndrome protecting these entrepreneurs. Typically, governments 
thus tended to over-commit themselves by deploying a vast array of direct and indirect policy 
instruments to shift resources towards themselves and favored private groups, all in the effort to 
promote growth.  These were usually under the table transfers which tended to manufacture 
profits for the state or the favored new entrepreneurial class.  The motivation was to promote 
industry, with relatively less attention paid to what was viewed as a stubbornly stagnant 
agriculture portrayed as a drag on the economy, and with peasants seen as non-responsive to 
prices and profit opportunities.  Generally, industrialization was viewed as equivalent to 
development, with policy makers in search of a second industrial revolution. 
 A logical accompaniment of this view of the world were “planning models” focusing on 
the flow of resources, domestically financed investment supplemented by foreign capital, and 
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paying relatively little attention to changes in the behavior of the system or the relevance of 
technology.  Such planning models, often based on simple Harrod-Domar foundations, started 
with exogenous population growth, per capita income targets and focused heavily on how, given 
certain input-output relations, necessary savings, domestic and foreign, would be sufficient to 
reach politically required targets.  There were, of course, also fancier models, including those of 
Mahalanobis 1955, modified later by Chenery and associates 1971, all of them relatively silent 
on price flexibility, exchange rate flexibility and other dimensions of the market mechanism. 
It should be noted that, while there was always some recognition of the importance of 
distributive issues, the predominant view of policy makers at that time was that growth and 
efficiency should take priority and that issues of equity, like income distribution and poverty 
alleviation, would be taken care of at a later date.  Clearly, high profit and savings rates were 
viewed as paramount objectives and any premature re-distribution viewed as a trade-off with the 
objective of growth. 
The planning school may be characterized by relative formalism in methodology, usually 
envisioning a multi-sector production function with multiple inputs and international variables, 
often exogenously postulated.  In this way economic plans could be seen to portray the operation 
and growth of the economy in a wholistic perspective, with all sectors tending to be viewed as 
homogeneous and symmetrical.  A related trait of the planning school was the systematic 
application of mathematical models in order to determine the magnitude of all the relevant 
variables consistently through time.  Such “planning for resources” was really based on a belief 
in the appropriateness of the existing policy rails on which the economy found itself.  However, 
by the 1970’s it had become increasingly clear that the development problem was one of 
transition from one regime to another during which changes in structure lie at the very heart of 
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the process, coupled with the realization that 5 year plans can quickly become political albatroses 
around the necks of governments, as exogenous shocks inevitably occur.  The real focus of 
planning consequently shifted gradually from a resource focus to devising strategies for policy 
change to accommodate the changing requirements of transition. 
It is undoubtedly correct to say that Solow 1957 and Kuznets 1955 provided the most 
important transitional mechanisms in the realm of both theory and policy as we move from this 
post-war consensus into what later became known as the era of the Washington Consensus.  
Solow’s 1957 signal contribution was to emphasize, really for the first time since Schumpeter 
1959, the importance of technology in generating growth, spawning a huge literature focused on 
measuring and quantifying the effects of technology change. This provided a new point of 
departure for neo-classical growth theory, not only replacing Harrod-Domar with a substitutable 
production function, but also enthroning exogenous technology change, plus the ensuing effort to 
whittle down the Solow residual as much as possible.  It introduced critical flexibility into the 
system and spawned a good deal of applied work on the role of R&D, patents and other forms of 
scientific endeavor, leading at a later stage to the so-called “new growth theory” (see below) 
which moved to try to endogenize technology change.   
It was, however, Kuznets 1971, though mainly concerned with describing modern growth 
rather than analyzing the transition process in getting there, who provided another essential 
ingredient focused precisely on the developing world at the end of the post-war consensus era.  
Kuznets was interested in why some developing countries were successful and others not and 
placed major emphasis on the sources of structural change over time as between agriculture, 
industry and services.  Chenery and his associates took up the cudgel, using regression analysis 
in order to depict dimensions of average LDC structural change, first via the use of cross-
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sections, and later through increasing resort to time series analysis and pooled regressions.  The 
basic question being addressed was how productivity gains and increments in output are 
allocated among sectors as income per capita rises and how one explains deviations from average 
patterns.  Kuznets always insisted that such structural changes resulted from the interaction of 
underlying changes in final demand and capacity conditions, with deviations from any normal 
pattern largely attributable to differences in the underlying state of nature.  He viewed policy as 
either basically accommodative or obstructive to the play of underlying economic forces and did 
not view it as an exogenous variable.  This is in contrast to Chenery’s inclusion of differences in 
policy among his typological categories.   
Over time there was a growing recognition of the potential relevance of flexibility in 
factor proportions and of the importance of labor-using or capital-saving technology change.  
Observers began to realize that distortions in relative factor prices, overvalued exchange rates, 
low interest rates, and biased internal terms of trade, all instruments of import substitution, not 
only discouraged agriculture, encouraged industrial capital and import intensity and limited the 
generation of employment, but also created windfall profits for favored elites long after such 
support was no longer necessary for infant industry reasons.  The realization that the enhanced 
use of the market needed to be complemented by institutional reforms, at least to the extent that 
small-scale rural development actors could obtain an adequate share of credit, foreign exchange 
and infrastructural attention, was but one indication of that gradual change in the development 






II. The Washington Consensus as Initially Conceived and Subsequently Amended 
It is undoubtedly unfair to attribute the realization that policy change is the key ingredient 
of successful development to the international financial institutions.  I rather would give credit 
for the realization that prices matter and that macro-economic stability matters to Little, 
Scitovsky, and Scott 1970, as well as to Bhagwati 1978, Krueger 1978, and Cohen and Ranis 
1971, among others, who insisted that a re-structuring of the rails of development was required.   
Once easy import substitution of the non-durable consumer goods type had run out of 
steam, most developing countries increasingly faced a critical choice:  continued import 
substitution, while moving towards more capital and technology intensive output mixes, or 
export orientation testing competitive international markets.  Trade liberalization was generally 
accepted as an instrument, but its timing was subject to large differences across the developing 
world. Export promotion often came first, accompanied by a shift from quantitative restrictions 
to tariffs, subsequently the unification of tariffs, and, gradually, their reduction, even if the 
timing was very differently implemented. But, performance lagged almost everywhere except in 
East Asia, which had moved further in rejecting the continued import substitution alternative. 
There can be little doubt about the important facilitating role of exports, extending 
beyond the hand-maiden role emphasized by Kravis 1970, even if one does not accept the notion 
that exports constitute the principal engine of growth and that export promotion, especially of 
non-traditional goods, represents the solution in virtually all circumstances.  It should be noted 
that even in small open economies that have been successful, such as Taiwan, initial 
development success was determined largely at home, via balanced domestic growth and the 
subsequent export of, first, traditional, i.e., agricultural, goods, before testing the international 
waters for non-traditional exports.  Trade and the associated international movements of 
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technology and capital have increasingly been seen of potentially great help but still as 
representing only an assist to the basic domestic development effort.  It should again be 
emphasized that the East Asians encouraged exports long before they opened up their domestic 
economies to competitive imports in a sustained fashion.  One causal chain ran from exports to 
growth via enhanced competitiveness as well as via the direct impact of imported technology 
through patents, human capital, and capital goods incorporated in FDI.  But another important 
causal chain also runs from domestic growth generated via R&D back towards the enhanced 
capacity to take advantage of export opportunities. 
One basic ingredient of the new emerging consensus was the need for macro-economic 
stability, increasingly accepted as a basic necessity by both orthodox and heterodox observers, 
whether inflation at 20% or 5% is viewed as the tolerable limit.  Avoidance of large-scale 
deficits as a percentage of GDP, along with too rapid monetary expansion, were seen as critical 
components, with tax reform and the shifting of public expenditure patterns usually part and 
parcel of the package. With the gradual rejection of structuralism, i.e., the belief in the non-
responsiveness of agriculture, and of export pessimism, attention focused instead on an enhanced 
reliance on liberalizing markets. The original list of Washington Consensus ingredients included 
other items such as privatization and unified and competitive exchange rates, both still under 
dispute today, and the simultaneous liberalization of financial markets, both domestic and 
international, the latter certainly with caveats now attached.  What has stood the test of time is 
the relative openness to FDI and the acceptance of the notion that the gradual deregulation of 
various control systems is essential for the full mobilization of the private sector. 
While not usually listed among the ingredients of the Consensus, the realization that 
technology choice and the choice of the direction of technology change could be of major 
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importance for successful development played an increasingly important role (see Stewart 1977 
and Evenson and Ranis 1990). The importance of public sector research, especially on export-
oriented cash crops, such as sugar, cotton, and coffee, had long been recognized, but its role in 
basic food crops, in non-traditional agriculture and in non-agricultural exports came only 
gradually.  The Green Revolution, after all, represented an imaginative combination of 
international and adaptive domestic research (see Griliches 1957 and Evenson and Kislev 1975).  
It became increasingly clear that food-producing agriculture cannot be neglected, that peasants 
do respond to their economic environment and that industry cannot pull an economy into modern 
economic growth if agriculture remains stagnant.  It is also interesting to note that R&D in 
medium and small-scale firms which usually cannot afford to do their own R&D, such as in 
China’s TVEs and Taiwan’s small-scale and medium-scale enterprises, had a large pay-off.  The 
productivity of carefully selected public sector research has come to the fore, even as horror 
stories can be told in reference to the white elephant aspect of many LDC science and technology 
institutes setting their own agendas not related to the actual needs of the economy.  But such 
stories do not obviate the point that, when increasingly hard budgets become credible, R&D as a 
public good can have an important role in permitting the continued realization of domestic 
balanced growth, combined with an export drive powered by dynamic comparative advantage. 
Most R&D, of course, takes place in the private sector.  One needs only point to the 
substantial discrepancy among developing countries in terms of levels of total factor productivity 
or, as some observers seem to prefer, the differential efficiency of investment allocation, to be 
convinced that an increased emphasis on indigenous applied science and technology is bound to 
pay off.  Tax codes can be modified to encourage greater risk-taking and increased flexibility in 
the legal implementation dimensions of intellectual property rights can be paid attention to as the 
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country begins to move up the development ladder.  Some countries choose to resort to a 
different kind of patent, the utility model, with a shorter period of protection and a lower 
threshold for discovery, one way of encouraging the potentially important, if not spectacular, 
adaptive or blue-collar type of technological change. This clearly also relates directly to the new 
growth theory literature (see below).  
Privatization was part of the macro package generally accepted in the 80’s, partly because 
of the enhanced efficiency it promised and partly because of the fiscal boost it provided, at least 
in the short run. On the other hand, critics of privatization have been able to point to the 
accompanying corruption in some of the transition countries of Eastern Europe as well as the all 
too frequent exchange of private for public monopoly power. (See Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 1996 
and Stiglitz 1991).  
It is fair to say that, while there was consensus about the necessary basic macro-economic 
ingredients of the package to ensure economic restructuring, there was also, from the beginning, 
a considerable difference of views concerning what constituted needed additional changes at the 
micro level, clearly much more differentiated by country.  These included enhanced labor market 
flexibility, legal, financial and other institutional reforms. Nevertheless, it is a fact that both 
bilateral agencies, especially USAID, which termed its 1960’s instrument program lending, and 
subsequently the World Bank and the IMF, which termed similar instruments structural 
adjustment lending, combined policy packages incorporating both macro and a variety of micro 
ingredients with fast disbursing loans.  This device has become the subject of lively debate, 
ranging from the cost effectiveness of the resources spent in support of country policy reforms 
all the way to the implications of extensive conditionality lists infringing on recipients’ sensitive 
internal affairs.   
 
12 
Undoubtedly today the bloom is off the rose of structural adjustment or program lending.  
Given the mixed record of aid conditionality cum reform packages compiled by the World 
Bank’s own internal evaluation unit (see also Easterly 2001), the argument currently being made 
is that the time may now be ripe to abandon the instrument altogether and either return to project 
lending, including those big bad dams, or move to the PRSPs currently being fashioned for the 
poorest LDCs.  In theory, policy-based lending can help countries achieve any objective, even if 
one has to admit that in the case of a multi-cook operation it is extremely difficult to precisely 
judge the contribution of such packages.  The counter-factual is typically unknowable.  But 
before disenchantment takes over completely we should recall that there are historical AID cases, 
such as Pakistan and Taiwan in the 1960s, and a number of World Bank cases, including Chile, 
Ghana and Poland in the 70s and 80s, where such packages worked well.   
I would argue, therefore, that, before the policy-based loan instrument is abandoned, it is 
preferable to see if enhanced decentralization by the World Bank, coupled with an effort to 
achieve real ownership by recipients, can still rescue it.  In my view, the structural adjustment 
loans of the past and the closely related PRSPs of today continue to be negatively affected by the 
rush to judgment on both sides, in the attempt to put together a package that can be signed off on 
so that the money can flow.  IFI staff and loan recipients are similarly motivated, the former 
seeing their rewards and promotions in terms of the volume of commitments made, the latter in 
terms of the relief expected from fast-disbursing loans.  All the rhetoric about the importance of 
quality and ownership still doesn’t have much bite, with both parties not really as concerned as 
they should be that the reform package is more than superficially a part of the body politic of the 
recipient.   
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The IFIs, in other words, all too often don’t act like banks and the borrowers all too often 
have a strong incentive simply to go through the motions in order to obtain quick relief.  With 
the desire to lend still overwhelmingly strong and the attached list of conditions too long and 
insufficiently differentiated, it is no overstatement to comment that both parties have reached a 
level of reform fatigue which clearly needs to be addressed. In the wake of the debt crisis of the 
80s this problem became particularly acute.  Just as it is impossible for U.S. bilateral aid to 
Egypt, for example, to secure both the support of the so-called peace process with Israel and 
improved economic performance, it is difficult to use one instrument to achieve both balance of 
payments crisis support and improved long term economic performance.  There is no doubt that 
the disenchantment with the structural adjustment experience of the 80s and 90s and the nascent 
disenchantment with the PRSPs on virtually the same grounds has led to a reassessment not only 
of development thinking but also of development policy.  With old certainties under pressure the 
oscillating search for some “silver bullet” continues. 
 
III. The Oscillating Search for a “Silver Bullet” 
With policy-based loans and conditionality under attack, development thought has been 
entering an era of some disarray, with a substantial number of competitive concepts in play.  
Some of these focus on the search for a more appropriate objective of development, others on a 
reassessment of how to get there.  Turning once again first to theory, viewing per capita income 
growth as “the” key objective has actually been under question for some time, see for example, 
Srinivasan 1994, Streeten 1994, Sen 1992 and Sugden 1993. In fact, as early as the 50s and 60s, 
both India and Sri Lanka focused on poverty and employment in their 5-year plans.  In the 70s a 
“basic needs” approach, zeroing in on the direct provision of essential commodities, and thus 
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shirt-circuiting income, made an appearance but was short-lived, partly because it never 
fashioned firm theoretical links to what else we know about development, partly because it was 
never really accepted abroad where it was seen as a device for explaining away lower aid levels.  
But serious mainstream attention to the distribution of income, to the extent to which private 
income poverty is being reduced, and, more recently, to the extent to which public income 
poverty, i.e., the distribution of public goods, is being addressed, came later, in the late 70s.  
During the 90s, the achievement of improvements in various dimensions of human development, 
i.e., infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, etc. has come to the fore as the appropriate 
fundamental objective of development.  All this, of course, does not mean that income has been 
dethroned, only that it is now seen increasingly as an essential means to societal ends rather than 
as an end in itself. 
But the concern with distribution has had a long and useful life, ever since Kuznets in the 
1950s worried about the possibility that income growth might have to be bought at the cost of an 
initially worsening distribution, i.e. the basic efficiency-equity trade-off (see Okun 1975). Aside 
from the large theoretical literature on inequality and growth in developing countries (such as 
Banerjee and Newman 1993, and Aghion and Bolton 1997), there has been a continuing lively 
debate ever since on whether or not travel along the so-called inverse U-shaped Kuznets curve 
was inevitable or avoidable. Mc Namara initially moved the World Bank in the direction of 
discussing distributional issues. While Dudley Seers talked about “dethroning the GNP”, what 
followed was “Redistribution With Growth” (Chenery and others 1974), a collaboration between 
Sussex and the World Bank, and a string of research projects, including “Growth with Equity” 
(Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1979), financed by the World Bank. 
 
15 
Current assessments are that, while most countries seem to experience some deterioration 
in income distribution during rapid growth, this is by no means a necessity and there are quite a 
few counter-examples, even outside of the well-known East Asian cases. (For example, see 
Fields 2001, Bourguignon and da Silva 2003, Deninger and Squire 1997, and Ravallion and 
Chen 1999). Certainly we have gotten away from using pooled cross-sections of historical data 
and are focusing more on country cases over time which yield a variety of patterns. Fei, Ranis 
and Kuo 1997 illustrate the case of Taiwan with rapid growth associated with improving 
distribution. (Also see Persson and Tabellini 1994). 
More controversial is the relationship between growth and income poverty alleviation.  It 
seems quite clear from the evidence that per capita income growth is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for poverty reduction (see Ravallion and Datt 1999, and Lipton and 
Ravallion 1995), the necessary rate of growth depending on its character. For example, with 
respect to the production of primary commodities, what matters is whether they are generated by 
small farmers on fairly equally distributed plots of land or on large land intensive plantations 
(see Deninger 1999).  In non-agriculture, much depends on technology and output mix choices 
yielding more or less labor-intensive outcomes (see Evenson and Ranis 1990). 
Among theoretical revisionisms has been the recent effort to revive import substitution 
models, supported initially by the “new trade theory” ideas of Paul Krugman1994 and, even 
more recently, the challenge to openness spearheaded by Stiglitz 2002 and Rodrik 1996, 1999, 
encouraging a revival of populism in the South.  Krugman emphasized the role of economies of 
scale and externalities in trade which was--in spite of his insistence that the concept was to be 
applied mainly to trade among rich countries--eagerly taken up by some adherents of a return to 
the “picking winners for the long run” view.  Yet more influential and popular have been the 
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recent attacks on globalization by Stiglitz and Rodrik in which they question the firmly held 
position among Washington Consensus adherents that increased openness correlates positively 
with higher rates of growth.  I acknowledge that infant industry protection has been deployed by 
every developing country in the post World War II era, as well as by currently developed 
countries during their earlier economic history.  Contrary to members of the Chicago School, I 
believe that such interventionism is necessary in the early stage of a country’s development; but 
it is also clear to me that the regime must be strictly time constrained, providing assurance of a 
more or less reliable trend in the direction of a gradual reduction of the large interventionist 
policy paraphernalia.   
Stiglitz and Rodrik, along with Wade 1990, Lall 1992 and Amsden 1989, assign the 
favorable results achieved by Korea and Taiwan, among others, to that large array of government 
interventions generating hot-house conditions for a new and relatively inexperienced 
entrepreneurial class; but they fail to pay adequate attention to the seemingly inevitable 
hardening of protectionist arteries if the signals for a gradual but persistent lowering of these hot-
house temperatures are not made transparent and credible.  Developed countries are sometimes 
accused of “kicking the ladder” which brought them developmental success in the past.  My 
reading is that, while this may be true, the more successful cases used a ladder that did not 
consist of continued and increasingly expensive secondary import substitution policies but was 
consistent with the expectations of a liberalization trend that enhanced competitiveness 
domestically as well as internationally over time. 
More recently, the emphasis on human development, building on the work of Amartya 
Sen 1985, Mahbub ul Haq 1992 and the Human Development Reports of the UNDP, have 
attracted a good deal of theoretical attention, including, in particular, the two-way relationship 
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between growth as the necessary engine and human development as the bottom line objective. 
The relationship between growth and improvements in infant mortality, life expectancy or 
literacy—preferable to any necessarily arbitrary index—represents a still somewhat 
underdeveloped set of production functions (see Behrman 1996 and Birdsall 1985). The 
feedback from increments in human development back to growth comes closer to being captured 
by the conventional macro-economic production function as amended over time, i.e. including 
both conventional Solow-based and unconventional “new growth theory”-related approaches.  
This two-way relationship has been studied carefully by Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez 
2000 and in more recent work (Boozer, Ranis, Stewart and Suri 2004). We find convincing 
evidence across all developing countries over time to the effect that, in order to reach a virtuous 
cycle of sustained growth, accompanied by continuous improvements in human development, 
priority attention must be given to the latter.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to reach the 
“promised land” of mutual reinforcement between growth and human development from an 
asymmetric position favoring growth as a temporal priority.   
In the 1980s a new branch of growth theory came into vogue which, based on some well-
accepted earlier notions in the literature, (e.g. Arrow 1962), tried to endogenize technology 
change through credible models of market externalities to explain some stylized facts in both 
developing and mature economies.  This literature, pioneered by Romer 1990, Lucas 1988, 
Grossman and Helpman 1991, and, more recently, Aghion and Howitt 1998, shares the Solowian 
view of technology change as the driving force of output growth, but, while emphasizing 
constant or even diminishing returns of scale at the individual firm level, sees increasing returns 
of scale, i.e. externalities, at the economy level. Grossman and Helpman analyzed the open 
economy implications of such endogenous growth theory models, and focused largely on R&D 
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which actually serves two functions, i.e. accelerating the introduction of new capital goods and 
providing spill-overs by reducing the cost of manufactured goods.  While LDCs undertake 
relatively little R&D, at least of the formal or white-collar variety, the transition to economic 
maturity in the developing world requires an ever-increasing competence to adopt and adapt new 
technologies (See Pack and Westphal 1986). 
On the policy front, guided by the somewhat uncertain search for theoretical advances, 
we continue to worry about the relative importance of market failure and government failure, 
while moving from “market friendly” government interventions to focusing increased attention 
on the institutions needed to repair both inadequate government infrastructure and improve the 
functioning of markets. Perhaps the most important change in development thinking in recent 
years has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of such institutions, ranging all the way 
from property rights to civil service reform to the financial system, the priorities depending on 
the pre-existing state of play, i.e. the initial conditions emphasized by Kuznets and others many 
years ago.   
Much current thinking and modeling focuses on the reduction of transactions costs as a 
result of relevant investments, following the path outlined by North 1990, 1991,Williamson 
1975, and others.  This renewed emphasis on institutional economics also has relevance for the 
argument between “big bang” and gradualism approaches attending any developing country 
reform package.  If, for example, institutional changes affecting domestic financial markets have 
to be put in place before a system can proceed to open itself up to international capital 
movements, especially of the short-term portfolio variety, both the timing and the sequencing of 
reforms are clearly materially affected.  Early efforts in the transition countries of Eastern 
Europe to do virtually everything at once, while neglecting the institutional dimensions, have, in 
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fact, led to the conclusion that this is a riskier choice than the gradualism exhibited in East Asia, 
including Mainland China.  A prominent contrast is the way privatization was organized in many 
other parts of the developing world as well as in the transition countries of Eastern Europe, i.e. in 
the absence of adequate provision for regulatory institutions to ensure a workably competitive, 
post-privatization private sector, as well as the reduction of corruption in the very process of 
transferring public goods into favored private hands. 
More recently, in fact, mostly in the last decade, there has been a strong emphasis among 
development economists, both amongst academicians as well as on the policy scene, on the 
micro foundations of development issues. Development economists and policy makers have 
become more concerned with micro level decisions, realizing their role in the growth of an 
economy. For example, the role of women in household decision-making, and the effects of the 
proportion of household resources controlled by women, on the health and nutrition of their 
children has been empirically documented in a number of micro studies (e.g. Behrman and 
Wolfe 1987 and Hoddinot and Haddad 1991).   
The role of microeconomics in understanding poorly functioning markets has also come 
to the forefront of development economics research. The importance of poorly functioning land, 
labor and credit markets is being studied extensively. And the role of informal networks and 
institutions in dealing with such market failure is now the focus of much research, relating 
directly to the more macroeconomic literature not only on the role of but also on the formation of 
relevant institutions.  
A seminal paper in this area was Townsend 1994 who looked at whether households in 
India are able to pool risk across space in the presence of poorly functioning capital markets. He 
directly tested the general equilibrium implications of such a consumption-smoothing model 
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using household level data for India and found that households do indeed pool risk across space. 
What is fascinating about this paper (and subsequent work) on consumption smoothing is that it 
is not all that different from the income pooling ideas behind models of dualism that were at the 
forefront of development economics research a few decades ago. This literature has also 
subsequently fueled a large microeconomic literature in development economics on credit 
institutions and their efficiency (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Udry 1994, Deaton and 
Paxson 1994).  
There are also various micro-economic studies on the impacts of differential labor and 
land markets on bottom line outcomes. The interlinkage of contracts and the two-tiered nature of 
labor markets in developing economies and their efficiency has been studied extensively (see 
Eswaran and Kotwal 1985, Mukherjee and Ray 1995, Foster and Rosenzweig 1996, Rosenzweig 
1988). Again, this literature is closely tied to the earlier models of surplus labor and dualism. The 
aim of this literature has been to understand the implications of market failures, on what 
institutions may arise at a micro level to cope with such failures and on how best to structure 
policy to make allowance for these institutions (for example, see Greif 1993).  
Finally, we have recently seen a large increase in the active role played by micro-credit 
organizations and NGO’s in developing countries, in almost every possible policy sphere, 
ranging from not just credit (such as the Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh), health (ICS 
in Kenya) and education, but to even intellectual property rights and codes of conduct. Not only 
do such NGO’s have macro-economic impacts, but their micro-economic impacts are also being 
evaluated. A very active future area of development economics promises to evaluate the impacts 
of NGO policies and social policy programs. For example, Pitt and Khandker 1998, and 
Morduch 1999 analyze the Grameen Bank program in Bangladesh; Kremer and Miguel 2001 
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look at the impacts of de-worming health programs in Kenya; and Skoufias 2001, Schultz 2001 
look at the impact of the Progresa schooling initiative in Mexico.  
 
IV. Best Guesses as to the Way Forward 
In this concluding section, I intend to unabashedly ride several hobby horses, hopefully 
going in the same general direction, with respect to where development thinking and policy are, 
or at least should be, heading.   
 First, on the methodology or theory front, I think we will be moving away from large n 
Barro-type (see Barro 1991, 1997) cross-sections, which have included more and more variables, 
including geography and religion, accompanied by diminishing robustness, and towards a set of 
small n comparative historical studies encompassing typologically “neighboring” countries.   
 Second, we need to pursue much more carefully the aforementioned two-way relationship 
between growth and improvements in human development, especially with respect to the 
preferred sequencing, if sustained long-term improvement in both dimensions is to be attained. 
 Third, I believe we will need to take a much closer look at the pros and cons of 
decentralization and its relation to democratization and decision-making by the broader body 
politic.  Such analysis of decentralization should clearly not only be of the customary vertical 
type, i.e., focusing on local government and its fiscal and other functions, moving from 
deconcentration and delegation to the still rare case of devolution, but also horizontal 
decentralization, moving from the domination by the executive branch of government, especially 
the ministry of finance, to the legislative and the judiciary, representative of the critical rule of 
law dimension of democratic governance. 
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 There can be little doubt that greater local control over fiscal resources is bound to lead to 
larger expenditure on the social sectors as well as on small-scale infrastructure.  It is also likely 
to lead, given the benefit principle of taxation, to larger total resources being available for all 
purposes, while the promotion of national standards and the support of equity objectives across 
regions will continue to require central government action.  Central resource transfers for health, 
education and infrastructure in lieu of actual fiscal devolution have, none-the-less, significantly 
enhanced both growth and human development indicators whenever we have observed at least 
delegation in both unitary and federal government systems (see, for example, Ranis and Stewart 
1994 for the case of Indonesia and Habibi and others for the case of Argentina).  
 Fourth, I view plentiful natural resources and relatively easy access to foreign capital as 
extensions of the Dutch Disease problem, more serious than its narrower exchange rate 
implications, since they focus on decision-making with respect to reforms that may be needed 
but can be avoided. Not being “up against it” represents a prescription for not making the 
necessary political effort to overcome vested interests. I have observed a marked contrast 
between the more or less linear trend toward the depolitization of policy making in countries 
with relatively poor natural resource endowments and a consistently more oscillatory pattern of 
policy evolution in countries with good natural resources, including much of Latin America, 
Nigeria, and Indonesia.  Policy making in such resource rich countries illustrates a tendency 
towards excessive activism during good times, followed by attempts to artificially maintain 
growth by government action when times are relatively bad.  Moreover, there exists substantial 
evidence that an important indicator of the differential quality of policy response to the inevitable 
exogenous shock resides in the manner in which growth is financed.  The critical distinguishing 
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characteristic is not just the size of the tax effort, in other words, relative to the GDP, but also the 
relative reliance on covert vs. overt means of transferring resources. 
 The typical natural resource rich country case demonstrates that liberalization efforts 
initiated at the beginning of an upturn cannot be sustained once the improvement in the external 
environment encourages the government to expand expenditures additionally through money 
creation and budget deficits, inevitably leading to inflationary pressures and balance of payments 
crises down the road.  The basic point here is that policy evolution over time, while not 
completely endogenous, is intimately linked to an economic system’s initial conditions, a point 
well supported by the empirical record of contrasting countries in Latin America and East Asia 
and the intermediate cases of Southeast Asia (see Ranis and Mahmood 1992).  As a long-time 
observer of Indonesia, for example, I noted that whenever the price of oil was high Pertamina 
was favored by policy makers, culminating in policies unfavorable to growth or equity, while, 
when the price of oil was relatively low, Bappenas’ advice was accepted and reforms had a much 
better chance of being pursued and implemented. 
 Initial conditions, in other words, not only affect income levels but policy responsiveness 
and flexibility over time, i.e., the extent to which policies can be seen as accommodating or 
obstructing the gradual changes which all societies must undergo if they are to have a successful 
transition into modern growth.  It is not only the relative strength or weakness of a system’s 
natural resource endowment but also the strength or weakness of that system’s ability to attract 
long-term foreign capital “for the asking” which is relevant here.  The common culprit is the 
large rents emanating from the primary export sector and/or foreign capital inflows and the 
resulting animated struggle for these rents among various interest groups.  Foreign capital flows, 
especially those not of the direct investment type, are often strongly correlated with the size of 
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natural resource bonanzas and thus reinforce oscillations rather than acting in a counter-cyclical 
fashion.  My basic argument is that once the relationship between initial conditions and policy 
responses can be made more transparent the chances for a better understanding and support of 
the entire development process are enhanced.  After all, liberalization in monetary, fiscal and 
foreign exchange policies over time is not a function of religious belief but required by the need 
to maintain dynamic efficiency in an increasingly interdependent global economy. 
 What we can do about natural resource bonanzas is recognize their impact, a la Norway 
and Botswana, and try to neutralize them by prudential fiscal and monetary means.  What we can 
do about foreign capital inflows, especially of the public variety, is insist on much greater 
passivity by donors, accompanied by real ownership of reform programs on the part of 
recipients.  In spite of protestations to the contrary, the IFIs today still dominate the composition 
of reform programs and still try to assert their own views and impose some level of 
conditionality to get them accepted by recipients. Can the recipient really be allowed to take the 
initiative, with the international donor community willing to respond? Realistically, this would 
also mean accepting a generally lower level of lending of the “business as usual” type.  Passivity 
on the part of the IFIs and enhanced initiative by the developing countries does not, of course, 
mean that the international community would sign on the dotted line; but if the credibility of 
MDB policy-based lending is to be restored, current cynicism about the annual ritual dance, i.e. 
demanding conditionality and promising aid flows early in the year and then being driven to 
disburse later on regardless of what has been delivered, has to be overcome.   
 The new millennium seems to me a propitious moment to reexamine the way our foreign 
aid business is done.  I do not believe, for example, that the PRSP process focused on the poorest 
countries is sufficiently recipient-driven, given the fact that it still requires extensive IMF and 
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World Bank tutelage ex ante; in fact, the IMF has prepared a voluminous book of instructions 
outlining just how a PRSP is to be prepared (see Ranis and Stewart 2001).  Nor do I believe that 
the new window of the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account, intended to reward countries that 
have already done well, is going to be very helpful to those who most need help.  Developing 
countries have to be able to enter into an adjustment dialogue with an increased sense of 
initiative, involvement and ownership, complete with “self-conditionality.” And public capital 
inflows must be commensurate in volume, and especially in time, with the exposure to risk and 
the threat from veto players in the course of reform. 
 Fifth, the current trend towards gradual liberalization, of course, implies an increasing 
substitution of indirect for direct controls and a reduction of such controls generally, as we have 
seen in the case of foreign trade.  With respect to the macro policy picture, the general 
conclusion from experience is that the state’s ability to print money and the compulsory purchase 
of foreign exchange are more damaging than the temporary retention of high import duties 
during the development process.  The acceptance of a monetary philosophy according to which 
money supply and foreign exchange reserves are increasingly regarded as mediums of exchange 
instead of as purchasing power which can be artificially manipulated to achieve socially 
desirable goals is something gradually being accepted.  At the same time, generally low tax/GDP 
ratios can be enhanced in tandem with fiscal reforms, moving the system from indirect border 
taxes to indirect domestic taxes en route, ultimately, to domestic taxes which are more income 
elastic and less regressive. 
 With respect to the related question of the most appropriate exchange rate policy, this is 
apparently one of those areas on which it is especially difficult to pontificate as one assesses the 
experience of the past and attempts to look into the future.  There seems to be a clear bias 
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towards floating rates, with more or less dirty interventions as a realistic companion.  This stance 
avoids the need to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves in defense of the peg and gives a 
larger role to market determination.  This in essence is similar to monetary decontrol moving the 
system in the direction of an equilibrium interest rate. 
 Sixth, on the hoary question of the role of the state relative to the role of markets, the 
above discussion indicates that policy interventions should be focused more on institutional 
construction and certainly should not follow Amsden’s 1989 advice to move purposely against 
price signals.  In short, I find the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002 rejection of geography 
in favor of institutions, by reference to the reversal of fortunes in different parts of the pre and 
post-colonial world, utterly convincing.  Secondly, interventions on behalf of a particular 
industry or even individual firms should undoubtedly be minimized even as selective state 
intervention to correct market failure undoubtedly played a role in both the historical Japanese 
and post-war East Asian “miracle” cases.  The 1997 WDR recognized the importance of the state 
as part of the “new institutional economics.”  But favorite episodes of where directed credit 
policies went right, as in the Pohang steel company in South Korea or the automobile industry in 
Brazil, are still likely to be swamped by the admittedly large herd of industrial white elephants 
trampling small folks and potential newcomers in all parts of the developing world. 
 The point is sometimes made, by Rodrik and others, that Latin America, following 
Washington Consensus prescriptions, has done poorly, while interventionist East Asia has done 
well.  This conclusion is challengeable on several counts. First of all, as we have already noted, 
natural resource rich Latin America has been famous for a continuous stop/go pattern as between 
enhanced liberalization and increased interventionism, probably yielding the worst of both 
worlds, private and public, on average. Secondly, the secular trend towards the reduction of 
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political power in various markets has been much clearer in East Asia, even if, on average, 
tariffs, for example, might have been higher.  Gradualism in East Asia seems to have done better 
than shock therapy in Eastern Europe.  What also matters, I believe, in comparing development 
experiences over the last thirty to forty years, is the relative extent of isolation or cohabitation 
between industry and a meritocratic public service, the basic competence of a bureaucracy 
capable of pragmatic course reversal, as well as the extent to which the government is concerned 
about ensuring workably competitive conditions in the private sector.   
 The current emphasis on organizational and institutional change decidedly does not imply 
a diminished role for government or some sort of laissez faire prescription, but a different and 
undoubtedly more effective role for policy-makers.  Gradual, but persistent depoliticalization in 
the monetary, fiscal and foreign exchange arenas requires sensitivity to differing local conditions 
and the willingness and ability to stay the course. 
 Last, on the international scene, current negotiations on trade, intellectual property rights 
and other issues, both multilateral (e.g., WTO related) and regional, are under intense scrutiny.  
To examine each of these in detail in terms of current thinking and policy would take us too far 
afield; but it seems clear that overloading the WTO circuit with issues such as labor and 
environmental standards, just because it is the only organization with some teeth, will only result 
in immobilizing the organization. A clear and present danger to trade emanates from the 
mounting “spaghetti bowl” of Free Trade Agreements as well as the current escalating debate on 
out-sourcing. On the latter, I would enter a plea for urgent international action providing for 
vastly improved national adjustment assistance programs, possibly financed out of foreign aid 
budgets, which would establish consistent rules for countries facing the inevitable adjustment 
costs accompanying trade liberalization. Adjustment assistance, of course, has been tried before 
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in many countries, but in very few cases has it really focused not so much on extending 
unemployment insurance to those affected by job losses as on ensuring the portability of benefits 
and encouraging emerging new industries, including non-traded and export sectors, to hire 
displaced workers with the help of temporary subsidies.   The mutual benefits of freer trade are 
indisputable, but if “trade not aid” is to become more than a catchy slogan, we urgently need to 





Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 47(4): 1231-1294. 
Aghion, Philippe, and  Patrick Bolton. 1997. “A Trickle Down Theory of Growth and 
Development.” Review of Economic Studies 64(2): 151-172. 
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. 1998. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Amsden, A. 1989. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Arrow, Kenneth. 1962. “The Economic Implications of Learning-by-Doing.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 29(3): 155-173. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Andrew Newman. 1993. “Occupational Choice and the Process of 
Development.” Journal of Political Economy 101(2): 274-298. 
Barro, Robert J. 1991. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106(2): 407-443. 
Barro, Robert. 1997. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. 
Lionel Robbins Lectures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bauer, Peter T. 1957. Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press Reprint. 
Behrman, Jere R. 1996. “The Impact of Distributive Policies, Governmental Expenditure 
Patterns and Decentralization on Human Resources.” Philadelphia, PA: University of 
 
30 
Pennsylvania, Background Paper for United Nations Development Project (UNDP), 
Human Resources Development Report, 1996. 
Behrman, Jere, and Barbara L. Wolfe. 1987. “How Does Mother’s Schooling Affect the Family’s 
Health, Nutrition, Medical Care Usage and Household?” Journal of Econometrics 36(1-
2): 185-204. 
Birdsall, Nancy. 1985. “Public Inputs and Child Schooling in Brazil.” Journal of Development 
Economics 18(1): 67-86. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1978. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Anatomy and 
Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Boeke, J.H. 1953. Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies. Institute of Pacific 
Relations: New York. 
Boozer, Michael, Gustav Ranis, Frances Stewart, and Tavneet Suri. 2004. “Paths to Success: The 
Relationship Between Human Development and Economic Growth.” Economic Growth 
Center Working Paper No. 874. Yale University, New Haven, CT. 
Bourguignon, Francois, and Luiz Pereira da Silva. 2003. The Impact of Economic Policies on 
Poverty and Income Distribution: Evaluation Techniques and Tools. The World Bank 
and Oxford University Press. 
Chenery, Hollis B. 1971. Studies in Development Planning. Harvard University Press. 
Chenery, Hollis, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C. L. G. Bell, John H. Duloy, and Richard Jolly. 1974. 
Redistribution With Growth: Policies to Improve Income Distribution in Developing 
Countries in the Context of Economic Growth. New York: Oxford University Press 
 
31 
Cohen, Benjamin, and Gustav Ranis. 1971. “Import Liberalization and Growth: The Second 
Post- War Restructuring.” In Gustav Ranis, ed., Government and Economic 
Development. New Haven, CT: Yale University.  
Deaton, Angus, and Christina Paxson. 1994. “Intertemporal Choice and Inequality.” Journal of 
Political Economy 102(3): 437–67. 
Deninger, Klaus. 1999. “Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Evidence from 
Colombia, Brazil and South Africa.” World Development 27(4): 651-672. 
Deninger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1997. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality: 
Reexamining the Links.” Finance and Development 34(1): 38-41. 
Domar, Evsey. 1957. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. Oxford University Press. 
Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Eckaus, R. S. 1955. “The Factor Proportions Problem in Underdeveloped Countries.” American 
Economic Review 45(4): 539-565. 
Eswaran, Mukesh, and Ashok Kotwal. 1985. “A Theory of Two-Tiered Labor Markets in 
Agrarian Economies.” American Economic Review 75(1): 162-177. 
Evenson, Robert E., and Y. Kislev. 1975. Agricultural Research and Productivity. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Evenson, Robert E., and Gustav Ranis. 1990. Science and Technology: Lessons for Development 
Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
 Fei, John C. H., and Gustav Ranis. 1964. Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory 
and Policy. Homewood, Illinois: Richard A. Irwin, Inc. 
 
32 
Fei, John C. H., and Gustav Ranis. 1961. “A Theory of Economic Development.” American 
Economic Review 51(4): 533–565. 
Fei, John C. H., Gustav Ranis and S. W. Y. Kuo. 1979. Growth With Equity: The Taiwan Case. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Fields, Gary S. 2001. Distribution and Development: A New Look at the Developing World. 
Russell Sage Foundation and MIT Press. 
Fischer, Stanley, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos A. Vegh. 1996. “Stabilization and Growth in 
Transition Economies: The Early Experience.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(2): 
45–66. 
Foster, Andrew, and Mark Rosenzweig. 1996. “Comparative Advantage, Information and the 
Allocation of Workers to tasks: Evidence from an Agricultural Labor Market.” Review of 
Economic Studies 63(3): 347-374. 
Griliches, Zvi. 1957. “Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technical Change.” 
Econometrica 25(4): 501-522. 
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy. MIT Press. 
Greif, Avner. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.” American Economic Review 83(3): 525-548.  
Haberler, Gottfried. 1988. International Trade and Economic Development. San Francisco: 
International Center for Economic Growth. 
Habibi, Nadir, Cindy Huang, Diego Miranda, Victoria Murillo, Gustav Ranis, Mainak Sarkar and 
Frances Stewart. 2003. “Decentralization and Human Development in Argentina.” 
Journal of Human Development 4(1): 73-101.   
 
33 
Harrod, Roy F. 1939. “An Essay in Dynamic Theory.” Economic Journal 49(193): 14-33. 
Higgins, B. 1956. “The ‘Dualistic Theory’ of Underdeveloped Areas.” Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 4(2): 99-115. 
Hoddinott, John, and Lawrence Haddad. 1991. “Household Expenditures, Child Anthropometric 
Status and the Intrahousehold Division of Income: Evidence from the Cote d’Ivoire,’ 
Research Program in Development Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Discussion paper 
155. 
Kravis, Irving. 1970. “Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth: Similarities Between the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries.” The Economic Journal 80: 850-872. 
Kremer, Michael, and Edward Miguel 2001. “Worms: Education and Health Externalities in 
Kenya.” NBER Working Paper Number 8481, July 2001. 
Krueger, Anne. 1978. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Liberalization 
Attempts and Consequences. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Krugman, Paul R. 1994. Rethinking International Trade. Cmabridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1955. “Economic growth and Income Inequality.” American Economic Review 
45(1): 1-28. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1971. Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Lall, S. 1992. “Technological Capabilities and Industrialization.” World Development 20(2): 
165-186. 
Lewis, Arthur. 1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour.” Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies 22:139-191. 
 
34 
Lipton. M., and Martin Ravallion. 1995. “Poverty and Policy.” In Jere R. Behrman and T. N. 
Srinivasan, eds., Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 3. Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
Little, Ian Malcolm David, Tibor de Scitovsky and M.F.G. Scott. 1970. Industry and Trade in 
Some Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22: 3-42. 
Mahalanobis, P.C. 1955. “The Approach of Operational Research to Planning in India.” 
Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics 16(1,2): 3-62. 
Mandelbaum, K. 1945. The Industrialization of Backward Areas. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Malthus, Thomas Robert. 1815. An Inquiry into The Nature and Progress of Rent and The 
Principles by Which it is Regulated. London: John Murray. 
Morduch, Jonathan. 1999. “The Microfinance Promise.” Journal of Economic Literature 37(4): 
1569-1614. 
 Mukherjee, Anindita, and Debraj Ray. 1995. “Labor Tying.” Journal of Development 
Economics 47: 207--239. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: G. Duckworth. 
North, Douglass. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C. 1991. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1): 97-112. 
Nurkse, Ragnar. 1953. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
35 
Okun, Arthur. 1975. Equality and Efficiency. Washington: The Brookings Institution.  
Pack, H., and Westphal, L. E. 1986. “Industrial Strategy and Technological Change”, Journal of 
Development Economics 22: 87-128. 
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 1994. “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?” American Economic 
Review, 84(3): 600-621. 
Pitt, Mark, and Shahidur R. Khandker. 1998. "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on 
Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of the Participant Matter?" Journal of 
Political Economy 106: 958-996. 
Prebisch, Raúl. 1962. “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal 
Problems.” Economic Bulletin for Latin America 7(1): 1-22. 
Ranis, Gustav, Frances Stewart, and Alejandro Ramirez. 2000. “Economic Growth and Human 
Development.” World Development 28: 197- 219. 
Ranis Gustav, and S. A. Mahmood. 1992. The Political Economy of Development Policy 
Change. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Ranis, Gustav, and Frances Stewart. 1994. “Decentralization in Indonesia.” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 30. 
Ranis, Gustav, and Frances Stewart. 2001. “The Debt-Relief Initiative for Poor Countries: Good 
News for the Poor?” World Economics 2(3): 111-124.  
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen. 1999. “When Economic Reform is Faster than Statistical 
Reform: Measuring and Explaining Inequality in Rural China.” Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 61: 33–56. 
Ravallion, Martin and G. Datt. 1999. “When is Growth Pro-Poor? Evidence from the Diverse 
Experience of India’s States.” Policy Research Working Paper WPS 2263, World 
 
36 
  Bank. 
Ricardo, David. 1951. “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.” In Piero Sraffa, 
ed., with the collaboration of M.H. Dobb, The Works and Correspondence of David 
Ricardo, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. “Understanding Economic Policy Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature 
34(1): 9-41. 
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. Making Openness Work: The New Global Economy and the Developing 
Countries. Washington, D.C.: The Overseas Development Council. 
Romer, Paul. 1990. “Endogenous Technological Change.” Journal of Political Economy 98(5): 
S71-S102. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul. 1943. “The Problem of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe.” Economic Journal 53: 202-211. Reprinted in A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh, 
eds., The Economics of Underdevelopment. Bombay: Oxford University Press.   
Rosenzweig, Mark, and Kenneth Wolpin. 1993. “Credit Market Constraints, Consumption 
Smoothing and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income 
Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India.”  Journal of Political Economy 101(2):223-
244. 
Rosenzweig, Mark. 1988. “Labor Markets in Low Income Countries.” In Hollis Chenery and T. 
N. Srinivasan, eds., Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 1. Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
Schultz, T. Paul. 2001. “School Subsidies for The Poor: Evaluating a Mexican Strategy for 
Reducing Poverty.” Discussion Paper, No. 102, Food consumption Nutrition Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C. 
 
37 
Schultz, Theodore W. 1964. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1959. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Sen, Amartya Kumar. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge: Harvard University Press for 
the Russell Sage Foundation. 
Sen, Amartya Kumar. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Singer, Hans Walter. 1950. “U.S. Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas: The 
Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries.” American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings 40: 473-485. 
Skoufias, Emmanuel. 2001. “PROGRESA and its Impacts on the Human Capital and Welfare of 
Households in Rural Mexico: A synthesis of the Results of an Evaluation by IFPRI.” 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC. 
Smith, Adam. 1880. The Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Solow, Robert. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 52: 65-94. 
Solow, Robert. 1957. “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 39, 312-20. 
Srinivasan, T. N. 1994. “Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the Wheel?” 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 84(2): 238-243. 
Stewart, Frances. 1977. Technology and Underdevelopment. London: MacMillan. 




Stiglitz (1991), “Some theoretical aspects of the privatization: application to Eastern Europe”, 
Paper presented for the Third Villa Mondragone International Conference, Rome, June 
1991. 
Streeten, Paul. 1994. “Human Development: Means and Ends.” American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings 84(2): 232-237.  
Sugden, Robert. 1993. “Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality 
Reexamined by Amartya Sen.” Journal of Economic Literature 31: 1947-1962. 
Townsend, Robert. 1994. “Risk and Insurance in Village India.” Econometrica 62(3): 539-591. 
Udry, Christopher. 1994. “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical 
Investigation in Northern Nigeria.” Review of Economic Studies 61: 495-526. 
ul Haq, Mahbub. 1992. “Human Development in a Changing World.” UNDP Occasional Paper 
No. 1. 
United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report. Various Issues. 
Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the Market. Princeton, NJ. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press. 
World Bank. 1997. World Development Report. The State in a Changing World. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
